At the time of the proposal of the Non-Proliferation State and nuclear weapons, it was within 20 years. Instead, more than forty years later, five states are not parties to the non-proliferation treaty, and they include the other four states that are presumed to possess nuclear weapons. [6] Several additional measures have been taken to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear non-proliferation system and to prevent States from acquiring the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, including export controls of the Nuclear Weapons Supplier Group and enhanced review measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. As noted above, in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice stated that „there is an obligation to conduct and conclude in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.“ [18] Some critics of nuclear-weapon States argue that they have failed to comply with Article VI by failing to make disarmament the driving force behind national nuclear weapons planning and policy, while calling on other states to plan their security without nuclear weapons. [135] In 1991, South Africa`s ambassador to the United States, Harry Schwarz, under international pressure and as an imminent change of government, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1993, then-President Frederik Willem de Klerk openly admitted that the country had developed a limited nuclear capability. These weapons were then dismantled before South Africa participated in the non-proliferation programme and opened up for IAEA inspection. In 1994, the IAEA concluded its work by declaring that the country had completely dismantled its nuclear weapons programme. The treaty was adopted on 7 July 2017, after two rounds of negotiations at the UN General Assembly. Both rounds were boycotted by all nuclear weapons that possessed states, most NATO countries and many military allies of nuclear-weapon States. In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to abolish all its weapons of mass destruction programmes and authorized US and British teams (as well as IAEA inspectors) to support this process and verify its completion. Nuclear weapons projects, gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment and other equipment – including enhanced SCUD missile prototypes – have been withdrawn from Libya by the United States.

(Libyan chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical bombs were also destroyed on the ground, with international checks, as Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention.) Libya`s failure to comply with its IAEA protection measures was reported to the UN Security Council, but no action was taken, with Libya`s return to security measures and Article II of the NPT being welcomed. [109] Critics of nuclear-weapon States (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) sometimes argue that what they see as the failure of NPT-recognized states to disarm themselves from nuclear weapons, particularly after the Cold War, has angered some non-nuclear signatories to nuclear nuclear non-proliferation weapons. Such a failure, these critics add, justifies the signatories of non-nuclear weapons to leave the non-proliferation treaty and develop their own nuclear arsenals. [19] That call came when the Trump administration negotiated with Russia the renewal of the START treaty, the largest arms control agreement to limit the size of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which is due to expire in February. China has long rejected the U.S. claim that China has also signed a successor to the START treaty.